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1 Introduction
Thanks primarily to the tari reductions negotiated under the auspices of the GATT and WTO,
international trade is likely as unfettered by restrictions as any other time in history. While the
gains from free trade are widely recognized, it is also well known that openness makes economies
more vulnerable to injury from adverse trade shocks. GATT founders were cognizant that injured
import competing groups might use such shocks as an excuse to renege on GATT agreements; for
that reason exceptions to tari obligations were provided within the GATT. These exceptions allow
governments to protect the injured sector while not abandoning the tari liberalization achieved in
other sectors.1
GATT exceptions allow governments to take actions in response to imports which are deemed to
have harmed the domestic competing industry. If injury is caused by \fair" trade (e.g., an increase
in imports due to tari reductions), a government can invoke the escape clause to restrain imports; if
injury is caused by \unfair" trade (e.g., dumping or government subsidization of imports), the policy
response is antidumping or countervailing duties. Dam (1970) points out that these exceptions have
been included in every GATT agreement. Moreover, he argues that the inclusion of these exceptions
was crucial for the success of the early GATT rounds. His view is that exceptions greatly increased
the number of sectors where taris were liberalized by diusing domestic political opposition toward
trade liberalization. In a sense, exceptions oered the promise of insurance for sectors injured by
the liberalization.
Clearly then, for many years policy-makers have taken for granted that trade policy can act
as insurance. However, the notion that trade policy can act as insurance was not formalized until
Eaton and Grossman (1985).2 In their model there is a single import competing sector and single
export sector. The import competing sector is subject to price shocks. The goods are produced
with two factors; one factor (labor) can be allocated after the price shock is realized while the other
factor (capital) can only be allocated before the terms of trade are realized. Eaton and Grossman
(EG) demonstrate that a tari can raise ex ante welfare if insurance markets are incomplete.
EG's insight has spurred a number of other papers, most notably those by Staiger and Tabellini
(1987) and Dixit (1987, 1989a, 1989b). These related papers also assume that markets are incom-
plete and that factors are not completely mobile ex post. Staiger and Tabellini use the basic EG
framework to examine the time consistency of tari protection. While EG and Staiger and Tabellini
were willing to leave implicit the reasons for the incompleteness of insurance markets Dixit argues
that the source of the incompleteness can be important. For instance, he shows that when the
market failure is explicitly tied to adverse selection or moral hazard the laissez-faire equilibrium
may be Pareto optimal. Following EG's approach, we will leave the precise source of the market
failure implicit, but note that unobservable actions and outcomes are not the only source of market
1See Jackson (1969) for a description of the legal foundations for exceptions. Staiger (1995) discusses some
economic issues relating to GATT rules and institutions.
2The idea that trade policy might act as insurance was informally discussed for many years, e.g., Corden (1974)
and Baldwin (1982).
1incompleteness. Rather, the transaction costs of insuring agents against trade shocks are surely
quite large and will likely preclude complete insurance. In addition, trade shocks may well give rise
to bankruptcy concerns, implying that markets will likely be at least partially incomplete. Finally,
there might be other distortions in the economy that preclude complete insurance.3
We believe, however, the EG model is not well suited to study GATT exceptions for at least
two reasons. First, GATT MNF taris are typically negotiated years in advance and thus are very
dicult to be levied in a contingent fashion. GATT exceptions, on the other hand, are precisely
designed to be levied after the trade shock. Second, and the more troubling concern, exceptions like
antidumping and the escape clause are sector specic protection. With a single import-competing
sector, EG's model can not adequately characterize the conditions when sector specic protection
is desirable. In their model the tari is levied on all import competing sectors; therefore their paper
is better interpreted as formalizing the eect of a uniform tari.
In this paper we develop a model that allows us to better answer the question of whether GATT
exceptions can act as insurance. With the EG model serving as the foundation for our analysis, we
allow for multiple import competing sectors which are subject to sector specic price shocks. This
allows us to understand and contrast the distortions created across sectors. As in the EG paper, we
assume capital is immobile ex post and markets are incomplete. We show that GATT exceptions
raise welfare by providing insurance.
In addition, we compare the ecacy of contingent measures with the traditional \across the
board" tari protection ala EG. We show that these policies dominate uniform taris. In contrast
with EG, we nd that the optimal uniform policy may involve export taxes. The dierence lies in
the fact that in our somewhat more general model only one sector benets from the imposition of
a uniform tari while the other sector is worse o. Thus, when it comes to uniform policies we nd
that what is good for the goose is not good for the gander.
Thus, our model provides a theoretical foundation for the notion that GATT exceptions can
provide insurance. Given the unprecedented use of GATT exceptions|in particular antidumping
actions|during the past twenty years, many question whether insurance is the motivation for
many of the actions (Bhagwati, 1988; Finger, 1993; Krueger, 1995).4 Brieﬂy stated, the concern
is that antidumping procedures allow investigations to be conducted when there is little evidence
of injury or unfair actions. Given the apparent capture of antidumping by protectionist interests,
we also examine whether an alternative policy might could also serve as insurance. In particular,
we consider a policy wherein the adversely aected sector is oered a subsidy which is nanced by
taxes on the non-aected sectors; we nd that this \tax and subsidize" policy also increases welfare.
This suggests that it is possible to design alternative policies that have the benecial risk-sharing
3Consider the case where insurance against market shocks is expensive, due to the existence of a monopoly in
insurance. The rst best would be to eliminate the monopoly, in which case it might not be necessary to have
contingent protection. If this is impossible, contingent protection can be used as a second best way to avoid the cost
of not being able to insure against trade shocks.
4Staiger and Wolak (1994) nd that many U.S. antidumping complaints are not primarily aimed at winning
duties, but rather are at hindering the foreign rival during the investigation (in their terminology, many industries
are \process lers").
2properties of current GATT exceptions but without their weaknesses.
2 The Model
We consider a three sector model of a small open economy facing stochastic international prices.5
The goods are X; Y 1;Y 2; all are consumed domestically. We also assume that in all states of the
world all three goods are produced domestically. Following EG we assume that at the time capital
must be allocated between productive sectors the terms of trade are unknown. In contrast, labor
can move between sectors after the uncertainty is resolved and after the trade policy is implemented.
We assume that good X, the export good, is produced under constant returns to scale using
only labor. We let X be the numeraire good; to simplify we assume that X = G(LX)=LX,s o
w = 1. The other two goods are imported and are produced using a CRS technology with capital
and labor. The outputs of the import competing goods in state s are given by
Y 1s = F1(K1;L 1s);Y 2s = F2(K2;L 2s);
where Ki and Lis denote the amount of capital and labor employed in the production of good i in
state s. The production functions are quasi-concave and twice dierentiable.
Each household has one unit of labor and k units of non-divisible capital. Each household must
allocate its capital to one sector. We assume that total endowment of labor is one (L = 1) implying
that K = k is total capital. Full employment implies LXs + L1s + L2s =1a n dK1 + K2 = K = k.
Let i  Ki=K = Ki=k be the proportion of households that allocate their capital to sector i,s o
that Ki = iK. Since we can associate the households to the sector in which they invest, it follows
that there are 1 households in sector 1 and 2 =1− 1 households in sector 2.
Let Pis be the world price of good i =1 ;2 in state s. The domestic price can be written as
pis =( 1+tis)Pis,w h e r etis denotes the ad valorem tari for good i in state s.L e t Cijs be the
consumption of good i by households invested in sector j in state s. The value of imports are
dened as
Ms = P1sM1s + P2sM2s = P1s(1C11s + 2C12s − F1)+P2s(1C21s + 2C22s − F2): (1)
The return to a household from her capital investment in sector i is
ris = pisFi
K(Ki;L is);
where the subscript K indicates partial derivative. The income accruing to the typical household
5The results can be easily extended to the case of n import competing sectors.
3in industry i is
yis = pisFi
K(Ki;L is)k + w + Ts; (2)
where Ts denotes tari revenue in state s. We assume the revenue is distributed equally among
households in a lump sum fashion.
There are three states of nature. State s occurs with probability s, s 2S= fA;B;Cg.I n
state A (B) sector 1 (2) receives a negative price shock; in state C neither import competing sector
receives a shock. Throughout much of the paper we will suppress the superscript s unless doing so
leads to confusion.
The key question we are concerned with is the welfare eects of tari policy. Given the small
country assumption, free trade is the optimal policy unless there are terms of trade shocks. In light
of the uncertainty trade policy may now act as insurance and hence raise welfare. The desirability
of such a policy depends in part on the nature of the tari. In section 3 we examine the benchmark
case when the government sets a uniform tari. In this case t1 = t2 = t and tari revenue is
simply T = tM. In section 4 we consider sector specic contingent taris|such as antidumping
and escape clauses. In this scenario the tari is levied only on the injured sector, implying case
tari revenue is T = tiPiMi.
Letting V is  V (yis;p 1s;p 2s) denote the indirect utility function of a type i household in state s








1V 1s + 2V 2s
: (3)





V 1s − V 2s
=0 : (4)
3 Uniform tari policy
We begin by considering the eect of imposing a uniform tari in case of a negative shock (and
no tari if there is no shock). Since we believe that anticipated policies are of greater interest, we
assume that all agents internalize the existence of the uniform tari.7
6Good X also enters the utility function, but since it is the numeraire good it is convenient if we suppress it in
the indirect utility function.
7The eect of a uniform tari when the tari is anticipated is similar. This is somewhat surprising since in general
the tari alters the return in each of the possible states of nature, which in turn means that the allocation of capital
4For notational convenience we will use dot notation to denote derivatives with respect to the
tari, e.g., _ y  dy=dt, _ M  dM=dt, etc. The following result will useful in deriving the main
welfare result.
Lemma 1 The eect of an anticipated uniform tari on sector i income is
dyi
dt
 _ yi =
PiFi
i + M + t _ M; i=1 ;2:
Proof: First note that
_ w = PiFi
L + piFi
LK _ Ki + piFi
LL _ Li =0 ;i =1 ;2:
Dierentiating equation (2) and solving yields
_ yi = PiFi
Kk + piFi
KKk _ Ki + piFi













































+ M + t _ M
=
PiFi
i + M + t _ M; (5)
where we have used Euler's theorem three times.
Q.E.D.











y − V 2s
y )

(_ y1s − _ y2s)+P1s(C12s − C11s)+P2s(C22s − C21s)
	
Proof: Consider the eect of a tari on welfare in state s:
could depend on whether the tari is anticipated. In the case of a uniform tari, however, this eect does not exist.
This rather surprising result is explained by the fact that the relative price of the import goods p
1=p
2,r e m a i n st h e
same with or without the tari. Given that ex ante investment in each sector provides the same expected utility, we
nd that anticipated and unanticipated protection has the same eect on income.
5_ Ws = s1 
V 1s
y _ ys
1 + V 1s





2 + V 2s
1 P1s + V 2s
2 P2s
(6)
where we have denoted dV=dpi  Vi. Using Roy's identity, we get









2 −P 1sC12s −P 2sC22s
: (7)
We now use Lemma 1 to get (we now suppress the superscript s to simplify the notation)
_ Ws = s1V 1
y
n





P2F2=2 + t _ M + M −P 1C12 −P 2C22
o
: (8)
Using the import equation (1) we have
M −P 1C11 −P 2C21 = P1[2(C12 − C11) − F1]+P2[1(C22 − C21) − F2]
and a corresponding expression for M −P 1C12 −P 2C22. Substituting these into (8) yields
_ Ws = s1V 1
y
n
P1(F1=1)+t _ M + P1 
2(C12 − C11) − F1
+ P2 




P2(F2=2)+t _ M + P1 
1(C11 − C12) − F1
+ P2 
1(C21 − C22) − F2o
:
U s i n gL e m m a1n o t et h a t
_ y1 − _ y2 =
2P1F1 − 1P2F2
12 : (9)
Substituting this expression gives
_ Ws = s12V 1
y
n





(_ y2 − _ y1)+( t _ M=1)+P1(C11 − C12)+P2(C21 − C21)
o
;
from which we obtain
6_ Ws = 12s(V 1s
y − V 2s
y )

(_ y1s − _ y2s)+P1s(C12s − C11s)+P2s(C22s − C21s)
	










where we again use superscript s to denote the state. Evaluating at t = 0, we obtain the desired
expression.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 allows us to evaluate the welfare eect of a uniform tari. Suppose there is a negative
price shock to sector 1 (state A). We have that y1A <y 2A, hence (V 1A
y − V 2A
y ) > 0 because of
diminishing marginal utility. We can also sign the consumption terms if the importables are not
inferior (both terms are positive). Note however that the term _ y1A − _ y2A is negative (from (9)).
Therefore we cannot sign the overall expression (10). The same ambiguity exists in state B.S i n c e
the optimal policy in state C is free trade, we must conclude that







Proposition 1 contrasts with EG's (1985) nding that a small tari raises welfare when there
are negative import price shocks. The dierence lies in the fact that our model allows for multiple
import competing goods and while a uniform tari carries benets to the injured sector (as in EG)
it has a negative eect on the other import competing sector. This result helps explain why we
do not observe countries using uniform tari policies to safeguard domestic industries from sector
specic terms of trade shocks.
4 A sector specic tari
We now consider the case when a sector specic tari is imposed whenever there is a shock to a
particular sector. We will assume that the government reacts by imposing tari ti on good i when
there is a shock to that sector. All other sectors remain unprotected. Formally, the domestic price





ti > 0i f i =1a n ds = A or if i =2a n ds = B;
0 otherwise.
A sector-specic tari has two eects: an ex post eect on the allocation of labor once the
state and the applicable tari are known, and an ex ante eect on the allocation of capital between
7sectors. For instance, suppose we are in state A. A ni n c r e a s ei nt h es t a t eA tari raises the
attractiveness of sector 1, since the bad state turns out to be not so bad (since the tari raises the
expected return to sector 1 capital). This implies that more capital will be invested in sector 1
(and less in other sectors). Hence, a state contingent tari will have an eect on the capital stocks
in all states, in contrast to the case of a uniform tari.
Without loss of generality we will study the welfare eect of a state A contingent tari (i.e., a
tari t1 > 0). All the results are directly applicable to a state B contingent tari. Dierentiating


































































s(V 2s − V 1s)=0 ;
where the last equality follows from (4).
Q.E.D.
8Lemma 4 The change in income due to a state A contingent tari is
_ y1A =
P1AF1
1 + M1A + t1 _ M1A;
_ y2A = M1A + t1 _ M1A:
Proof: From the wage equation 1 = w = piAFi
L, i =1 ;2, we have that
_ w =0=P1AF1
L + p1AF1
LL _ L1 + p1AF1
LK _ K1 = p2AF2
LL _ L2 + p2AF2
LK _ K2: (12)
Dierentiating (2) it follows that the change in income in state A is
_ y1A = P1AF1
Kk + p1AF1
KK _ K1k + p1AF1
KL _ L1k + t1 _ M1A + M1A
= P1AF1
Kk + p1AF1
KK _ K1k + p1AF1







































+ t1 _ M1A + M1A
=
P1AF1
1 + t1 _ M1A + M1A;
where we have used Euler's theorem three times.
_ y2A = p2AF2
KK _ K2k + p2AF2
KL _ L2k + t1 _ M1A + M1A
= p2AF2
KK _ K2k + p2AF2







































+ t1 _ M1A + M1A
= t1 _ M1A + M1A;
using Euler's theorem two times.
Finally, recall that there is no income from a state A contingent tari in states B or C.T h u s ,
in states B and C, yis = w + risk. Hence
9_ yis = pisFi
KLk _ Li + pisFi
KK _ Kik =0 ;s = B;C
by Euler's theorem.
Q.E.D.








Proof: As above, we will proceed by analyzing a state A contingent tari. Recall that
@V iA
@t1 = V iA
y _ yi + V iA
1 P1A;i =1 ;2;
and that
M1A −P 1AC11A = P1A  
2(C12A − C11A) − F1
;
M1A −P 1AC12A = P1A  
1(C11A − C12A) − F1
:








































1(C11A − C12A) − F1
= P1AF12(V 1A
y − V 2A
y )+P1A12(C12A − C11A)(V 1A
y − V 2A
y ) > 0
The last expression is positive. To see this, note that y1A <y 2A; hence the rst term in the right
hand side is positive because of diminishing marginal utility of income. The second term is positive
because whether or not y2 >y 1, the terms C12A−C11A and V 1A
y −V 2A
y always have the same sign.
The only remaining step is to show that dW s=dt1 =0f o rs = B;C. But this is simple enough,
since we have shown in Lemma 3 that _ yis =0 ,i =1 ;2 for all states s = B;C. Since a state A
contingent tari has no direct eect on prices in the other states it follows that
10@V is
@t1 = V is






dt1 =0 ;i =1 ;2;s = B;C:
Q.E.D.
5 Specic taxes and subsidies
An alternative policy instrument are specic taxes and subsidies to the sectors. We consider an
ad valorem production subsidy is to sector i in state s. To x ideas, producers receive price





i > 0i f i =1a n ds = A or if i =2a n ds = B;
0 otherwise.
In other words, producers in sector i only receive the subsidy when i receives a negative shock. We
assume that consumers continue to face world prices and that the subsidy is paid by lump sum
taxation, so that taxes in sector i are is  iisPisFis.
Consider for instance when state A is realized and sector 1 receives the negative price shock.
In the rest of the section we will we omit the superscript denoting the state unless doing so leads
to confusion. Let 1 P 1F1; therefore the total value of the subsidy is 11. The income received
by type i household is
yi = w + piFi
Kk − iii;i =1 ;2: (13)
Using hat notation to denote derivatives with respect to the subsidy to sector 1 (i.e., ^ y  dy=d1,
we can show
Lemma 5 The change in income due to a state A contingent subsidy cum tax is
^ y1 =
1
1 + 2(1^ 1 + 1)+^ 211
^ y2 = −2(1^ 1 + 1) − ^ 211
Proof: Dierentiating (13)
^ y1 = P1F1
Kk + p1F1
KK ^ K1k + p1F1
KL^ L1k + 2(1^ 1 + 1)+^ 211;
^ y2 = P2F2
KK ^ K2k + P2F2
KL^ L2k − 2(1^ 1 + 1) − ^ 211:
11Adding and subtracting piFi
KL ^ Ki(Li=i)a n dpiFi
LL^ Li(Li=i), using the fact that ^ w =0a n du s i n g
Euler's theorem gives the desired expression.
Q.E.D.
Recall that consumers face world prices, so the subsidy does not change the prices they face. Hence
dV i=d1 = V i


















(1 + 12)V 1




Note also that dW B=d1 = 0, as in the previous section. The negative shock implies that V 1A
y >
V 2A
y and hence the eect of the subsidy is always positive. Hence we have that







6 Conclusions and Extensions
Using a general equilibrium model with incomplete insurance markets, we have shown that con-
tingent protection on a sectoral basis will increase welfare when the economy is subject to sector
specic price shocks. Our model thus provides theoretical basis for the long held notion that GATT
exceptions can act as insurance. Trade negotiators have long argued that the inclusion of the most
popular sector specic tool|antidumping actions|is a pre-condition for the approval of any trade
agreement. The main result of the paper arms this intuition by showing that there is an insurance
role for antidumping that had not been considered in the theoretical literature.
We also show that there exist alternative instruments that also lead to improvements in welfare,
such as a set of lump sum taxes on all sectors coupled to a subsidy to the sector that receives the
shock. However, we believe there are two reasons why taxes and subsidies are not generally used
as insurance against price shocks. First, political economy reasons which make the imposition of
selective taxes non-attractive. Second, over the past twenty years there is considerable support for
the view that antidumping regulations have been captured by protectionist interests (Bhagwati,
1988; Krueger, 1995). Hence, from a protectionist viewpoint, the value of antidumping regulations
lies not only in its insurance aspects, but also in the fact that it can be manipulated.
One limitation of this paper is that it does not show why exceptions are needed in order to
sign trade agreements. If protection is what is desired, why is that not included in the original
12agreements? Another caveat is that out results should be interpreted as second best arguments for
contingent protection. As a rst best, policy should always be directed at removing the sources of
distortion, if possible.
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